two-sided matching markets with transfers. …

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on …

A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This … possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed “stable” if maintaining the …

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …

When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with … complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be … perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render …

We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching …, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional … is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under …

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for …