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This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325390
implementation leads to more delegation, but only if workers have high costs of obstructing informed decisions. We further find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403558
This paper examines the relationship between organization contextual variables and humanresource management (HRM) practices in small firms. The proposed model is based on anintegration of theoretical perspectives, including the resource-based approach, institutionaltheory, transaction cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325042
In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325914
find that, in case of delegation, managers (as predicted) put tighter restrictions when interests are less aligned. Workers … mixed strategy equilibrium under communication, which strictly outperforms optimal restricted delegation and is relatively …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526127
This study examines whether the CEO uses share repurchases to sell her equity grants at inflated stock prices, a concern regularly voiced in politics and media. We find that the timing of buyback programs and equity compensation, i.e., the granting, vesting, and selling of equity, is largely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013356457
This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented, the strength of the incentives included in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321765
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325988
Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical test developed by Courty and Marschke (2008) to detect whether the widely used class of Residual Income based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377217
We manipulate workers' perceived meaning of a job in a field experiment. Half of the workers are informed that their job is important, the other half are told that their job is of no relevance. Results show that workers exert more effort when meaning is high, corroborating previous findings on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377239