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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - 2010
that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045826
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein J. - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047243
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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - 2010
that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325647
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Optimal Incentives without Expected Utility
González-Jiménez, Víctor - 2022
probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented …, the strength of the incentives included in the optimal contract, and the location of incentives on the output space. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321765
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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Dur, Robert A. J. - 2008
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723001
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace
Dur, Robert A. J. - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723256
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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - 2008
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325990
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325934
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Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - 2006
Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058922
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Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations
Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - 2006
the implications of these contract imperfections for optimal organizational design. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325410