We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...

By combining two large data sets (on international trade flows and cross-border mergers and acquisitions – M&As), we test two implications of Neary’s (2003, 2007) general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model (incorporating strategic interaction between firms in a general equilibrium...

By combining two large data sets (on international trade flows and cross-border mergers and acquisitions - M&As), we test two implications of Neary's (2003, 2007) general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model (incorporating strategic interaction between firms in a general equilibrium setting)....

Antitrust laws prohibit private firms to coordinate their market behavior, yet many types of interfirm cooperation are legal. Using laboratory experiments, we study spillovers from legal cooperation in one market to non-competitive prices in a different market. Our theoretical framework predicts...

We analyze a market where firms compete in a conventional and an electronicretail channel. Consumers easily compare prices online, but some incur purchaseuncertainties on the online channel. We investigate the market shares of the two retailchannels and the prices that are charged. We find that...