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Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2001

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand … dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamiccontract has insurance companies offeringcontracts where the terms of the contract … on individualpast performance (like in car insurances). Weinvestigate whether allowing insurance companies to offer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324841

A Simple Model of Self-Assessments

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - 2006

We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325242

Self-Confidence and Strategic Deterrence

Charness, Gary; Rustichini, Aldo; van de Ven, Jeroen - 2011

We examine factors that may contribute to 'overconfidence' in relative ability on an intelligence test. We test … an equilibrium strategy, providing a rationale for strategic overconfidence. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326528

Identifying Risk-based Selection in Social Insurance: New Approaches and Findings

Ejrnæs, Mette; Hochguertel, Stefan - 2022

We study risk-based selection into a voluntary unemployment insurance (UI) scheme. To disentangle behavioral effects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013356496

Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device

Bovenberg, A.L.; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001

contracts to crowd out implicit insurance, even though the latter yields higher welfare.Integrating the principal-agent and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325071

The Welfare Effects of Discrimination in Insurance

van der Noll, Rob - 2006

We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325544

Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data

Abbring, Jaap; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - 2008

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325921

Competition for a Prize

van der Noll, Rob - 2006

I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325234

Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk

Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; de Vries, … - 2004

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325499

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638