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Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653

Auctions, Market Prices and the Risk Attitude Effect

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2005

This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op-erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket comparedto a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argumentare differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325283

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638

Mergers in Bidding Markets

Janssen, Maarten; Karamychev, Vladimir - 2013

We analyze the effects of mergers in first-price sealed-bid auctions on bidders' equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue. We also study the incentives of bidders to merge given the private information they have. We develop two models, depending on how after-merger valuations are created. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326240

Sequential Auctions, Price Trends, and Risk Preferences

Hu, Audrey; Zou, Liang - 2014

We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491368

Sequential Auctions with Generalized Interdependent Values

Hu, Audrey; Zou, Liang - 2016

A common assumption in the analysis of symmetric auctions is that the bidders' value estimates exhibit positive informational externalities (PIE). This assumption implies upward drifting price sequences at sequential auctions, which is challenged by an empirical regularity, known as the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451525

Cheap-talk Communication in Procurement Auctions: Theory and Experiment

Onderstal, Sander; Yang, Yang - 2020

auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and … the winning supplier have misaligned interests regarding the terms, the buyer benefits from ex-ante communication relative … to no communication and ex-post communication. Our experimental data provide strong evidence for the predictions in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012233975

Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases

Offerman, Theo; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Ziegler, Andreas - 2020

The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427171

Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Bos, Olivier; Gomez-Martinez, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander - 2017

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819446

Balanced Unit Prices, the Case for Split Award Unit-Price Auctions

Renes, Sander - 2012

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory has shown that they can attract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115145