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Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

People in inferior bargaining positions are often vaguer when they express their preferences. In this paper, we explain how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901

Money Talks? An Experimental Investigation of Cheap Talk and Burned Money

Haan, Thomas de; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2011

We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes. Theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side, in which senders either use costless messages, money, or a combination of the two....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183255

Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning

Huang, Jiaping - 2014

are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … network and other parameters. Given the complexity of the system we use a standard technique for estimating the solution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061677

Persuading an audience: Testing information design in the laboratory

Ziegler, Andreas - 2023

Governments, central banks, and private organizations frequently face the challenge of convincing their audience to take a specific action. One key choice is whether to send a public message that can coordinate the audience's actions or to rely instead on private messages that may differ across...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469659

A Simple Model of Self-Assessments

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - 2006

We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325242

The Self-Perception Theory vs. a Dynamic Learning Model

Swank, Otto H. - 2006

Several economists have directed our attention to a finding in the social psychological literature that extrinsic motivation may undermine intrinsic motivation. The self-perception (SP) theory developed by Bem (1972) explains this finding. The crux of this theory is that people remember their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325504

Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation

Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - 2004

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325563

On the Role of Pre-Determined Rules for HRM Policies

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - 2011

Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325637

Why Are Residents Reluctant to Consult Attending Physicians?

Swank, Otto H. - 2009

A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325698