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The ING Illiquid Assets Back-up Facility announced January 2009 was a SWAP-based insurance to reduce ING’s exposure to Alt-A related risk. Did the deal involve state aid? Usingmarketprices to evaluate the SWAP directly is impossible because markets for Alt-A based CDOs had collapsed. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255729
CoCo’s (contingent convertible capital) are designed to convert from debt to equity when banks need it most. Using a … on other banks in the system in the likely case of correlated asset returns, so bank runs elsewhere in the banking system …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255852
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255875
While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255930
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256172
This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256233
Does demand for safety create instability ? Secured (repo) funding can be made so safe that it never runs, but shifts risk to unsecured creditors. We show that this triggers more frequent runs by unsecured creditors, even in the absence of fundamental risk. This effect is separate from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256299
restructuring provide banks with incentives to restructure bad loans and free up resources for new economic activity. Other … interventions lead banks to roll over bad loans, tying up resources in distressed firms. Our analysis suggests that zombie banks are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256408
incentives for risk creation.When banks differ in credit opportunities, a Pigovian tax on short-term funding is efficient in … credit incentives are strongest.When banks differ instead mostly in gambling incentives (due to low charter valueor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256463
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions … maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at higher level of accountability there is a shift to private control …. At the transition point there is a jumpin risk taking, as private banks do not internalize the social costs of bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256743