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The Dutch drinking water sector experienced two drastic changes over the last 10 years. Firstly, in 1997, the sector association started with a voluntary benchmarking aimed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the sector. Secondly, merger activity arose. This paper develops a tailored...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504883
Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257045
Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838600
See also the article 'Mean and bold: on separating merger economies from structural efficiency gains in the drinking water sector' 2010, <I>The Journal of the Operational Research Society</I>, 61, 222-34.<P> The Dutch drinking water sector experienced two drastic changes over the last 10 years. Firstly,...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255577
A situation in which a finite set of players can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450812
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Siberian Advances in Mathematics', 2002, 12, 97-125.<P> A cooperative game with transferable utilities, or simply aTU-game, describes a situation in which players can obtain certainpayoffs by cooperation. A solution mapping for these games is...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256545
We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256580
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256619
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Economics Letters', 2012, 117, 786-789.<P> We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256656
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some relational structure. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework taking into account both communication and hierachical features derived from this participation. In fact, this new set or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256706