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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests.<p>This paper has been accepted by <A href …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257530

Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456

Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256628

Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution

Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A situation in which a finite set of players can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450812

How Risk Sharing may enhance Efficiency in English Auctions

Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

We investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an English auction— in a setting that extends Maskin and Riley (1984, <I>Econometrica</I> 52: 1473-1518) in three aspects: (i) the seller can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have...</i>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256719

Auctions with Numerous Bidders

Caserta, Silvia; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except for a few simple distribution function for the bidders'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256726

Sequential Auctions, Price Trends, and Risk Preferences

Hu, Audrey; Zou, Liang - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256734

Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions

Renes, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory have shown that they can attract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256772

Mergers in Bidding Markets

Janssen, Maarten; Karamychev, Vladimir - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

We analyze the effects of mergers in first-price sealed-bid auctions on bidders' equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue. We also study the incentives of bidders to merge given the private information they have. We develop two models, depending on how after-merger valuations are created. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256791

If Winning isn't Everything, why do they keep Score? A Structural Empirical Analysis of Dutch Flower Auctions

Berg, Gerard J. van den; Klaauw, Bas van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

This paper provides a structural empirical analysis of Dutch auctions of houseplants at the flower auction in Aalsmeer, the Netherlands. The data set is unique for Dutch auctions in the sense that it includes observations of all losing bids in an interval adjacent to the winning bid. The size of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256795