This paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk. We argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty...

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the corporate governance structure and the division of profits between human and financial capital. In a democratic society where financial wealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restrain governance by...

This article proposes a theory of corporate transparency and its determinants. We show that under imperfect product market competition, the corporate transparency decision affects the value of equity and debt claims differently. We then embed this insight in a model of endogenous investor...

We study whether Russian Financial-Industrial Groups facilitate access by Russian

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...

We study whether Russian Financial-Industrial Groups facilitate access by Russianfirms to investment finance. We compare firms which are members of official FinancialIndustrial Groups and/or are owned by a large Russian bank with a control set of large firmscategorized by dispersed ownership...

This paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk. We argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty...

This article proposes a theory of corporate transparency and its determinants. We show that under imperfect product market competition, the corporate transparency decision affects the value of equity and debt claims differently. We then embed this insight in a model of endogenous investor...

The paper seeks to explain the huge cross country variation in private pension funding,shaped by historical choice made when universal pension systems were created after theGreat Depression. According to Perotti and von Thadden (2006), large inflationaryshocks due to war damage devastated middle...

In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporategovernance structure and the return to human and financial capital.We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently diffused, thereis political support for a strong governance role for dispersed equitymarket investors, and...