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We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257081
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838630
There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256471
See also the publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2013, 41, 671-683.<P> A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members called...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257629
A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have a considerable impact on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036248
We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256580
cooperation where the set of feasible coalitions is an accessible union stable system, and provide an axiomatization of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256706
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'European Journal of Operational Research', 2014, 238, 786-796.<P> Generalized characteristic functions extend characteristic functions of 'classical' TU-games by assigning a real number to every ordered coalition being a permutation of any...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257247
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2014, 76, 343-361.<P> It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of (weighted) digraph games. To be specific, they are...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257309
We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513218