This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …

. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non …-pay auction and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the … anomaly. First, participation in the all-pay auction is substantially lower than in the other mechanisms while the average …

earns zero worth. We illustrate this difference between these two solutions by applying them to auction games. …

auction— in a setting that extends Maskin and Riley (1984, <I>Econometrica</I> 52: 1473-1518) in three aspects: (i) the seller … can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences, and (iii) the auction can have a binding … verifiable by deduction prior to the auction –the premium also benefits the seller and therefore leads to a Pareto improvement of …

bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except …