Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infinite overlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is also the inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...

This discussion paper led to a publication in the <A HREF="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109000109">'Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization'</A>, 2009, 70(1-2), 374-388.<P> In this paper we analyze a large sample of individual responses to six lottery questions. Wederive a simultaneous estimate of risk aversion γ and the time preference discount...</p></a>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069612000927">'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>, 2012, 64(3), 342-363.<P> Optimal climate policy is studied in a Ramsey growth model with exhaustible oil reserves, an infinitelyelastic supply of renewables, stock-dependent oil extraction...</p></a>

Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infiniteoverlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as aNash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is alsothe inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...

In this paper we analyze a large sample of individual responses to six lottery questions. We

This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...

We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications...

In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislative system implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the period it takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit of this pre-commitment.<BR><BR>

We study two aspects of globalization. It allows a decision-maker to go beyond his own local experience and to learn from other decision-makers in addressing common problems. This improves the identification and diffusion of best practices. It also provides extra information to `markets' that...

We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions against social welfare, weighted by political accountability.