Many river basins will likely face higher hydrologic variability, including extreme floods and droughts, due to climate change, with economic and political consequences. Water treaties that govern international basins could face non-compliance among riparians and inter-state tensions as...

This paper argues that the notion of focal points is important in understanding bargaining processes. Recent literature confines a discussion of the usefulness of the notion to coordination problems and when bargaining experiments result in outcomes that are inconsistent with a straightforward...

See also 'Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Bargaining' in <I>Economic Theory</I> (2001). Volume 17, p. 81-99).<P> Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in asimple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding tomilitant union behaviour...</p></i>

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the...

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the <I>International Game Theory Review</I> (2008), 10, 257-278.<P> This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers...</p></i>

We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call "preopening". During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly...

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...

This paper has resulted in a publication in <I>Labour Economics</I> (2013), 23, 50-56.<P> The paper provides a theoretical foundation for the empirical regularities observed in estimations of wage consequences of overeducation and undereducation. Workers with more education than required for their jobs...</p></i>

See also 'Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences', <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> (2011), Vol. 73, pp.507–516.<P> We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect...</p></i>

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation...