In the labor market, statistical discrimination occurs when employers' beliefs about workers' behavior induce different groups of workers to invest at different rates in their education. Thus, even though groups may be identical ex-ante, the beliefs of the employers are self-fulfilling....

We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the...

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

We investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an English auction— in a setting that extends Maskin and Riley (1984, <I>Econometrica</I> 52: 1473-1518) in three aspects: (i) the seller can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have...</i>

We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes. Theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side, in which senders either use costless messages, money, or a combination of the two....

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>Experimental Economics</I> 2013, 16(1), 52-87.<P> Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent...</p></i>

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.<p> The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper...</p>

This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocalresponses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more thanpositive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-servingattributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...

Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infiniteoverlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as aNash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is alsothe inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...