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Auctioning and Selling Positions : A Non-Cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts

Brink, René van den; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - 2014

Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037678

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700

Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257267

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256036

An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256353

Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game

Neugebauer, Tibor; Poulsen, Anders; Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2008), volume 66, pages 243-250. We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256827

Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

. 166, issue 2, pages 286-298. A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction … they would like to get in case they have the highest bid on more than one object. This type of auction has been used in the … Netherlands and in Ireland to auction available spectrum. We show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256854