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A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences
Ballester, Miguel Angel; Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order $L$ over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247862
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On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
Ruth Mart?ez; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247863
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Sincerity in Simple and Complex Voting Mechanisms
Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel Ballester; Biel, Pedro Rey - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572250
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Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting
Ballester, Miguel Angel; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alter- natives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582620
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Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies
Bervoets, Sebastian; Merlin, Vincent - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006
This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247853
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Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs
Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010
games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two … exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784
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Bargaining in a changing Environment.
Ponsati, C.; sakovics, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996
We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572215
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Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines
Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006
matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582677
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Relative Wages, Costly Acquisition of Skills and Patterns of Unionisation.
Sanchez Losada, F - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996
The objective of this work is to study the effects of centralized, sectorial and decentralized bargaining patterns on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168435
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The Division Problem under Constraints
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single- peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We char- acterize axiomatically the family of extended...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836463