We study the testability implications of public versus private consumption in collective models of group consumption. The distinguishing feature of our approach is that we start from a revealed preference characterization of collectively rational behavior. Remarkably, we find that assumptions...

We present revealed preference characterisations of Nash-bargained consumption decisions in a two-player game. Our main analysis focuses on the symmetric Nash-bargaining solution with observed threat point bundles. However, we also present the testable implications of the generalised...

We develop a new data envelopment analysis (DEA)-based methodology for measuring the efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs) characterized by multiple inputs and multiple outputs. The distinguishing feature of our method is that it explicitly includes information about output-specific inputs...

We consider the testable implications of the Cournot model of market competition. Our approach is nonparametric in the sense that we abstain from imposing any functional specification on market demand and firm cost functions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for (reduced form)...

We provide a nonparametric 'revealed preference' characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general individual preferences that can be non-convex. Our main result is the Collective Afriat Theorem, which parallels the...

We apply the collective consumption model of Browning et al. (2010) to analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly. The model focuses on individual preferences, a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple, and a sharing rule that governs the...

The transferable utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. We establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for...