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When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the worker's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive...

The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper offers a model that can contribute to explain why this is the case. We show...

We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. The analysis shows that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot contracts and repeated game relational contracts. We show that...

Lower barriers to entry and developments in world capital markets have increasedthe actual and potential mobility of multinational enterprises. This poses challengesfor host countries' tax policies. The paper examines implications for such policies, formultinantionals' investment decisions and...

In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who deter-mine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage dis-tribution, and many …firms allow self-managed teams to freely determineinternal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labour.We analyze, and test...

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in humancapital intensive industries? We present a model that may explainthis. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ana-lyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimeswhen agents possess indispensable...