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Delegation, worker compensation, and strategic competition

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2014

We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are delegated to the firms' workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multiagent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330371

Intrafirm conflicts and interfirm competition

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2011

We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305874

Coordination failure in capacity-then-price-setting games

Güth, Werner; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra - 2019

In capacity-then-price-setting games, soft capacity constraints are planned sales amounts where producing above capacity is possible but more costly. While the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts equal prices, experimental evidence often reveals price discrepancies. This failure to coordinate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985043

Strategic delegation in price competition

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2012

We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310155

Three-person envy games: Experimental evidence and a stylized model

Bäker, Agnes; Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, … - 2015

In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of … responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy … responder can accept or reject the allocator's choice with rejection leading to zero payoffs for all three players. Comparing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481548

Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: Theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

Güth, Werner; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra - 2018

In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011947621