Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group de- cisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running...

We elicit time preferences of a representative sample of 1,102 Dutch individuals and also confront them with a series of incentivized investment decisions. There are two treatments which di¤er by the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment...

Revealed preference theory o¤ers a criterion for decision-making quality: if decisions are high quality then there exists a utility function that the choices maximize. We conduct a large-scale ?eld experiment that enables us to test subjects?choices for consistency with utility maximization and...

In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000b), we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it leads to lower exclusion costs for the incumbent, than simultaneous contracting....

We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. A firm has monopoly power in one market but faces competition by a second firm in another market. We compare treatments where the monopolist can bundle its two products to treatments where it cannot, and we contrast simultaneous...