How does the choice to regulate a market take place? And how does regulation influence market outcome? We argue that to explicitly model the simultaneity between these two issues makes a qualitative difference in the analysis of the role of regulation, and empirically test our model in the U.S....

This paper empirically investigates contrasting views on the politics of economic policy. Merging different databases, we test various predictions coming form different strands of literature, with the aim of explaining the cross-sectional and temporal variation in the degree of regulatory...

This paper provides empirical evidence on the extent of network effects and compatibility between networks in mobile telecommunications. We specify a structural model of demand for mobile telephone service, which allows us to identify the parameters of interest from the S-shape of mobile service...

This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms’ market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of political parties affected...

This paper argues that the study of policy incidence in industrial organization needs to take the endogeneity of government into account. The point is made by investigating whether political considerations are important in terms of understanding the causes and effects of deregulation using data...

This paper develops a political-economy model of price regulation. Firms' lobbying activity for a given regulatory status might generate a simultaneity problem between the effects and the determinants of regulatory decisions. We explicitly model this two way causality, and empirically test our...