We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of...

Suppose in each equation, not counting covariance restrictions, we need one more restriction to meet the order condition. If we now add to each equation a restriction that its structural residual is uncorrelated with the residual of some other equation, is the parameter of the new model...

In this paper, we study preferences over Savage acts that map states to opportunity sets. Conditional preferences over opportunity sets may be inconsistent with indirect-utility maximization due to implicit uncertainty about future preferences (preference for flexibility), or to an intrinsic...

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice under uncertainty for decision-makers whose preferences are exhaustively described by partial orders representing ""limited information."" Specifically, we consider the limiting case of ""Complete Ignorance"" decision problems characterized...

The concept of a strict extended partial order (SEPO) has turned out to be very useful in explaining (resp. rationalizing) non-binary choice functions. The present paper provides a general account of the concept of extended binary relations, i.e., relations between subsets and elements of a...

The purpose of the paper is to provide a general framework for analyzing ""preference for opportunities."" Based on two simple axioms a fundamental result due to Kreps is used in order to represent rankings of opportunity sets in terms of multiple preferences. The paper provides several...

This paper raises the problem of how to define revealed probabilistic beliefs in the context of the capacity/Choquet Expected Utility model. At the center of the analysis is a decision-theoretically axiomatized definition of ""revealed unambiguous events."" The definition is shown to impose...

The central result of this paper establishes an isomorphism between two types of mathematical structures: ""ternary preorders"" and ""convex topologies."" The former are characterized by reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity conditions, and can be interpreted geometrically as ordered...

Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two ""like minded"" individuals cannot ""agree to disagree"" in the following sense. If they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E (using Bayes'' rule) on the basis of private...

We provide an introduction to interactive belief systems from a qualitative and semantic point of view. Properties of belief hierarchies are formulated locally. Among the properties considered are ""Common belief in no error"" (which has been shown to have important game theoretic applications),...