While economists have tended to focus on specific public policies when developing recommendations, the achievement of welfare objectives might depend more on the quality of policies than their content. This paper develops several measures of the qualities of policies across countries, arguing...

Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim of veto player theory by arguing that policy...

This paper introduces preliminary evidence from a cross-country database of policy characteristics and potential uses of that database. While most databases have emphasized either the content of policies (e.g., size of government deficits) or countries' formal institutions (e.g., political...

Public policies are the outcome of the interaction among a variety of key political actors, each with its own preferences and incentives, who meet in different arenas and interact within the constraints of the institutions that frame their engagement. Therefore, to recognize the reasons behind...

In this paper detailed information on the budget institutions of Latin American countries is collected. These institutions are classified on a hierarchical/collegial scale, as a function of the existence of constraints on the deficit and voting rules.

Financial turmoil is becoming a fact of life in Latin America. The 1990s have been characterized by enormous volatility in the magnitude and cost of capital flows. The correlation of capital swings across disparate countries suggests that the quality of emerging market policies in addition to...

This paper considers whether institutional factors, in this instance electoral systems and procedures, affect Latin American countries` fiscal performance as measured by the size of the public sector, fiscal deficits, the size of the public debt, and the degree of procyclality of fiscal policy....

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the...