A human subject laboratory experiment compares the real-time market performance of the two most popular auction formats … configurations and is statistically significant in most treatments. Revenue capture tends to be similar across auction formats in …

such procurement is an English auction followed by an auctioneer's option to engage in ultimatum bargaining with the winner … equilibrium strategy of exiting the auction at their costs and then accepting strictly profitable offers. Buyers generally … with auction prices when they should be invariant. We explain this deviation by modeling buyers' subjective posteriors …

We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in … fees according to the auction price sequences observed in the auction treatment. With endogenous selection into ultimatum … games via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium and auction prices emerge which …

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction - e.g. an electric power auction …

-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of … the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of small identity-dependent externalities. In general, however … equilibria of the first-price all-pay auction with complete information. With identity-dependent externalities equilibria are …

each round of the auction are implicitly defined (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations so that conditions for the … develop an econometric model thus extending the literature on structural estimation of auction models Finally an empirical … example illustrates how equilibrium learning affects bidding during the course of the auction. …

bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If …

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …