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Cooperation, Framing and Political Attitudes

Fosgaard, Toke R.; Hansen, Lars G.; Wengström, Erik - 2017

This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208784

Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca; Saglam, Ismail - 2011

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500188

Interpreting cynical beliefs about others

Sternal, Philipp - 2025

A growing number of studies suggest that individuals are cynical about others' behavior. But these findings often rely on self-reported rather than actual behavior as benchmark. A well-documented limitation of self-reports is their tendency to overstate good behavior. I introduce a simple,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015395889

Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!

Hu, Yingyao; Kayaba, Yutaka; Shum, Matt - 2010

How do people learn? We assess, in a distribution-free manner, subjects' learning and choice rules in dynamic two …-armed bandit (probabilistic reversal learning) experiments. To aid in identification and estimation, we use auxiliary measures of … subjects' beliefs, in the form of their eye-movements during the experiment. Our estimated choice probabilities and learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277527

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731

Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships

Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - 2015

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's (a) opportunity to commit to their partner, (b) the cost of dissolving committed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420551

Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships

Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420562

Play it again: Partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2013

forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420270

Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria

Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed - 2009

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP … equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137

Experience in Public Goods Experiments

Conte, Anna; Levati, Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia - 2014

We use information on students' past participation in economic experiments, as stored in our database, to analyze whether behavior in public goods games is affected by experience (i.e., previous participation in social dilemma-type experiments) and history (i.e., participation in experiments of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208688