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The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence

Ertaç, Seda; Koçkesen, Levent; Özdemir, Duygu - 2015

We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a 'one principal-two agent' context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440134

Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals

Chand, A.K.S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739598

Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: Experimental evidence on forward induction

Blume, Andreas; Kriss, Peter H.; Weber, Roberto - 2014

We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre … costs dramatically reduce message use, but efficient coordination of actions occurs with similar frequency to that observed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282459

Categorization and coordination

Daskalova, Vessela; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2014

The use of coarse categories is prevalent in various situations and has been linked to biased economic outcomes, ranging from discrimination against minorities to empirical anomalies in financial markets. In this paper we study economic rationales for categorizing coarsely. We think of the way...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380993

Discontinuous and Continuous Stochastic Choice and Coordination in the Lab

Goryunov, Maxim; Rigos, Alexandros - 2020

Coordination games have multiple equilibria under complete information. However, recent theoretical advances show that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208880

Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests

Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia - 2023

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014333781

Lavish returns on cheap talk: Non-binding communication in a trust experiment

Ben-Ner, Avner; Putterman, Louis; Ren, Ting - 2007

We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of two kinds of pre-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318961

Optimal delegation of sequential decisions: The role of communication and reputation

Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2017

We analyze delegation of a set of decisions over time by an informed principal to a potentially biased agent. Each period the principal observes a state of the world and sends a 'cheap-talk' message to the agent, who is privately informed about her bias. We focus on principal-optimal equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696314

Starting small to communicate

Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2018

We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060207

Nash Competive Equilibria and Two Period Fund Separation

Hens, Thorsten; Reimann, Stefan; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2004

We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858107