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Conte, Anna; Levati, Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia - 2014

' experience and history in their experiments if they want to improve the external validity and replicability of their results. … whether behavior in public goods games is affected by experience (i.e., previous participation in social dilemma …-type experiments) and history (i.e., participation in experiments of a different class than the social dilemma). We have three main …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208688

Generalized Maximum Entropy Estimation of Discrete Sequential Move Games of Perfect Information

Wang, Yafeng; Graham, Brett - 2013

We propose a data-constrained generalized maximum entropy estimator for discrete sequential move games of perfect information. Unlike most other work on the estimation of complete information games, the method we proposed is data constrained and requires o simulation or assumptions about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010892088

GARCH Estimation and Discrete Stock Prices

Amilon, Henrik - 2001

The continuous-state GARCH model is misspecified if applied to returns calculated from discrete price series. This paper proposes modifications of the above model for handling such cases. The focus is on the AR-GARCH framework, but the same ideas could be used for other stochastic processes as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208417

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung-Ha - 2007

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287796

Economic incentives and social preferences: A reference-based Lucas critique of public policy

Bowles, Samuel; Polanía Reyes, Sandra - 2009

Policies and explicit incentives designed for self-regarding individuals sometimes are less effective or even counterproductive when they diminish altruism, ethical norms and other social preferences. Evidence from 51 experimental studies indicates that this crowding out effect is pervasive, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287842

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung-Ha - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287863

Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods

Zhang, Jingjing - 2012

This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal sized groups compete for a prize that is shared equally among members of the winning group, regardless of their (costly) contributions to the group's success. We find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316824

Die EU-Zinsenrichtlinie: Ein Schuss in den Ofen?

Gläser, Lars; Halla, Martin - 2006

Die EU hat durch die Zinsenrichtlinie einerseits eindeutig von einer Politik, die auf einem Vertrauen gegenüber dem Bürger und einer gewissen Selbstbestimmung beruhte, zu einer Vorgehensweise gewechselt die durch Misstrauen und Kontrolle geprägt ist. Andererseits erscheinen die Regelungen der...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294497

Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups and free riding

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2009

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336001

Cooperation and effort in group contests

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2011

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336057