This paper provides a theoretical rationale for non-binding retail price recommendations (RPRs) in vertical supply relations. Analyzing a bilateral manufacturer-retailer relationship with repeated trade, we show that linear relational contracts can implement the surplusmaximizing outcome. If the...

This paper investigates why all-inclusive travel packages are offered at some hotels but not at others. By using the theory of transaction cost, it is argued that all-inclusive contracts mitigate a hold-up problem and that the severity of this problem varies with regards to the hotel's distance...

The paper investigates the determinants of trade credit and its interactions with borrowing constraints and the input combination of the firm, within an incomplete contract setting in which firms use a two-input technology and collateralised credit contracts. Assuming that the supplier is better...

Do tax systems distort firm-to-firm trade? This paper considers the effect of tax policy on supply chains in a large developing economy, the state of West Bengal in India. Using administrative panel data on firms, including transaction data for 4.8 million supplier-client pairs, we first...

This paper provides new UK evidence on the relationship between managerialincentives and firm risk using a hand-collected database of 3307 executive yearobservations (698 CEO years and 2609 other executive years). We find that therelation between pay performance sensitivity and firm risk...

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...

It is commonly believed that borrowers cannot be anonymous in unsecured credit relations because anonymity heavily reduces the scope for punishment and therefore makes credit unfeasible except for very special circumstances. However, we demonstrate that credit is generally feasible even if...

The theory of incomplete contracting is rival to that of complete contracting as a frame of reference to understand contractual relationships. Both approaches rest upon diametrically opposed postulates and lead to very different policy conclusions. From a theoretical viewpoint, scrutiny of the...

Ethnic networks are a way of overcoming informal barriers to trade such as information costs, risk, and uncertainty by building trust and by substituting for the difficulty of enforcing contracts internationally. We study networks which emerge from the interaction (i) between migrants and...