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The big carrot: High-stakes incentives revisited

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - 2009

Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335978

Creating an efficient culture of cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2017

that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011784301

Reputation transmission without benefit to the reporter: A behavioral underpinning of markets in experimental focus

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2015

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what would motivate an agent to report another's behavior when the pool of potential partners is large and it is easy enough for an aggrieved player to move on. We argue that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526719

Self-Organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction regimes

Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011

Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287722

State or nature? Formal vs. informal sanctioning in the voluntary provision of public goods

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011

dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287730

Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Matching

Gudmundsson, Jens - 2017

Rewards. This novel rule is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208741

Competition and the role of group identity

Cornaglia, Francesca; Drouvelis, Michalis; Masella, Paolo - 2019

The emergence of competition is a defining aspect of human nature and characterizes many important social environments. However, its relationship with how social groups are formed has received little attention. We design an experiment to analyze how individuals' willingness to compete is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012144230

Civic engagement as a second-order public good: The cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2019

Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012385442

Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring

Mengel, Friederike; Mohlin, Erik; Weidenholzer, Simon - 2018

total output is perfectly observed. We consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to collective punishment … in case total output fall short of a target. We find that cooperation is higher in the case of collective punishment … compared to both the case of no punishment and the case of standard peer-to-peer punishment which conditions on the noisy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208811

Mechanim design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927