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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive … matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our gradated approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple … mechanisms. While more demanding simplicity standards may reduce the flexibility of the designer in some cases, this is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588492

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013164118

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013285525

Mechanim design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2015

We study the bilateral trade problem put forward by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that agents are loss-averse. We use the model developed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to find optimal mechanisms for the minimal subsidy, revenue maximization and welfare maximization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282522

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2016

We study the bilateral trade problem put forward by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that agents are loss-averse, using the model developed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that the endowment effect increases the sellers information rent, and that the attachment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663168

Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools

Andersson, Tommy; Dur, Umut; Ertemel, Sinan; Kesten, Onur - 2018

Motivated by school admission systems used in, e.g., Turkey and Sweden, this paper investigates a sequential two-stage admission system with public and private schools. To perform the analysis, relevant axioms and equilibrium notions need to be tailored for the considered dynamic setting. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208839

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282463

Bidding Rings: A Bargaining Approach

Chatterjee, Kalyan; Mitra, Manipushpak; Mukherjee, Conan - 2016

We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208712

Markets and transaction costs

Jantschgi, Simon; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; … - 2022

Transaction costs are omnipresent in markets yet are often omitted in economic models. We show that their presence can fundamentally alter incentives and welfare in markets in which the price equates supply and demand. We categorize transaction costs into two types. Asymptotically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013441509