Building on the ‘law and economics’ literature, this paper analyses corporategovernance implications of debt financing in an environment where a dominant owner isable to extract ex ante ‘private benefits of control’. Ownership concentration may result inlower efficiency, measured as a...

We apply control rights theory to explain the structure and determinants of financial covenants in private equity backed leveraged buyouts. We analyze 130 German transactions from 2000 to 2008, covering about 40 percent of the LBO market during this period. We consider Germany to be a superior...

This paper presents an integrated analysis of the relationships between managerial share ownership (or alternatively the percentage of equity-based compensation), four additional corporate governance mechanisms, and firm value by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the process...

Einleitung: In der zweiten Hälfte der neunziger Jahre ist die Verbesserung der CorporateGovernance börsennotierter Gesellschaften zu einem intensiv diskutiertenThema geworden. Im Unterschied zu früheren Debatten, wie sie vor etwazwanzig Jahren anlässlich der Arbeit von Jensen/Meckling (1976)...

This paper examines the impact of agency conicts on corporate nancing decisions. Werst build a dynamic contingent claims model in which nancing policy results from a trade-obetween tax benets, contracting frictions, and agency conicts. In our setting, partially-entrenched managers set the rms'...

Using a new data set of small public firms in Germany, this paper analyzes the incentive and entrenchmenteffects associated witrh mangerial equity owernership. The relationship between firm value and insider ownership is found to be nonlinear: at low levels of ownership firm value is positive...

This paper tests two competing hypotheses about the influence of financial institutions as large shareholders on the performance of their industrial portfolio firms: the superior monitoring hypothesis versus the rent extraction hypothesis. The methodology of this study exploits the abolishment...

This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of takeovers in which the financing strategies of bidding firms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a...

This paper examines the unification of non-voting preference shares into a one share one vote structure using a sample of all German dual-class companies from 1987 until 2003. We test several hypotheses with regard to the reasons for the abolition of preference shares.First, as the separation of...

The rapid growth in index funds and significant consolidation in the asset-management industry over the past few decades has led to higher levels of common ownership and increased attention on the topic by academic researchers. A consensus has yet to emerge from the literature regarding the...