Showing 1 - 10 of 514
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315563
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315554
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890
Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence … activities. An efficient communication protocol grants complete information payoffs to all organization members, thereby … strategies before being consulted. Under these assumptions, "public advocacy" is the unique efficient communication protocol …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013470530
Modern communication technologies enable efficient exchange of information, but often sacrifice direct human … interaction inherent in more traditional forms of communication. This raises the question of whether the lack of personal … that self-selection into communication channels can be used to screen for dishonest people. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969191
We analyze delegation of a set of decisions over time by an informed principal to a potentially biased agent. Each period the principal observes a state of the world and sends a 'cheap-talk' message to the agent, who is privately informed about her bias. We focus on principal-optimal equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696314
We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060207
This paper studies optimal decision rules for a decision maker who can consult two experts in an environment without monetary payments. This extends the previous work by Holmström (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) who consider environments with one expert. In order to derive optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280752
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936493
bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority … ideological positions are publicly known, it may not be possible to have informative communication from the legislator who is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273671