Organized crime reinforces its corrupting influence on politics through violent intimidation. Anti-crime measures that increase the cost of corruption but not of the exercise of violence might accordingly lead mafia-style organizations to retaliate by resorting to violence in lieu of bribery. On...

Organised crime tightens its corrupting influence on politics through violent intimidation. Anti-crime measures that increase the cost of corruption but not of the exercise of violence might accordingly lead mafia-style organizations to retaliate by resorting to violence in lieu of bribery. On...

Over a quarter of the world's population lives in economies that have undertaken transitions from central planning to market economies. These transitions entail far-reaching and complex changes in social, economic and political institutions and have had widely divergent outcomes. Important...

Die EU hat durch die Zinsenrichtlinie einerseits eindeutig von einer Politik, die auf einem Vertrauen gegenüber dem Bürger und einer gewissen Selbstbestimmung beruhte, zu einer Vorgehensweise gewechselt die durch Misstrauen und Kontrolle geprägt ist. Andererseits erscheinen die Regelungen der...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

When Legislators introduce laws that award amnesties to 'low-rank' criminals co- operating with the justice, top criminals may bribe public officials to subvert the law. Legislators should anticipate this reaction and fight it back by introducing policies that bundle amnesties for low-rank...

Corruption is a widespread phenomenon. Nevertheless, causal evidence on the effects of corruption is still lacking. In this paper, we assess whether and how corruption affects cooperation using a public good game experiment. Overall, contributions to the public good are reduced by 30% when...

We investigate the existence of an "electoral cycle bias" in the timing of media coverage of news with high political value. In particular, we analyze how the electoral cycles at the regional level influence the coverage of news about corruption scandals in the Italian Regional Health Systems by...

We consider the modelling of credit migration risk and the pricing of migration derivativesour approach enlarges the traditional setup where credit risk is based on default solely.We implement the Regime Shifting Markov Mixture model developed in Andersson (2007)and Andersson and Vanini (2008)...

We consider the modelling of credit migration risk and the pricing of migrationderivatives. To construct a Point-in-Time (PIT) rating migration matrix as the underlyingvalue for derivative pricing we show first that the Affine Markov Chain models isnot sufficient to generate PIT migration...