one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium …

-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of … the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of small identity-dependent externalities. In general, however … equilibria of the first-price all-pay auction with complete information. With identity-dependent externalities equilibria are …

run. In the second-price auction, this is the truthful bid. In the first-price auction, bidding half of one’s valuation is … stable. The stable bid in the k-double auction is a toughening of the Chatterjee-Samuelson linear equilibrium strategy. If we …

each round of the auction are implicitly defined (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations so that conditions for the … develop an econometric model thus extending the literature on structural estimation of auction models Finally an empirical … example illustrates how equilibrium learning affects bidding during the course of the auction. …

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A … mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We … characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a …