The paper extends the Nash equilibrium concept to account for arbitrary behavioral heuristics. Players are allowed not only to choose strategies, but also to select behavioral rules how to choose strategies. It is argued that behavioral profiles are in equilibrium if no player can benefit from...

In a static symmetric duopoly the set of behavioral rules is extended to different types of markup pricing. Using an equilibrium concept suggested in Pasche (2001), it is shown that dependend on the markup neither pure Cournot nor pure Bertrand behavior is a behavioral equilibrium profile....

There is robust experimental evidence that in the ultimatum game real players often prefer a fair allocation which seems to be in contrast to rational decision making. In this paper rational maximizing behavior as well as norm-guided fair behavior are two possible behavioral rules. It is argued...

In standard market theory demand and cost functions have to be known to compute optimal price or quantity responses. In case of risk or uncertainty the decisions depend on expectations, i.e. estimated parameters. Even in case of rational inference these expectations itself are uncertain, at...

Es wird gezeigt, daß unter plausiblen Annahmen im Rahmen der bekannten technologischen Möglichkeiten (``technologisches Regime'') keine dauerhafte Entkopplung des Wachstums vom Umweltverbrauch, d.h. kein nachhaltiges Wachstum möglich ist. Das zentrale Argument ist, daß im Zuge des...

Empirical studies show that decisions deviate from the predictions of expected utility theory and violate the axiomatic foundations. Hence, many generalizations to non-expected utility theory have been developped. But empirically they did not provide an improvement over the standard approach. In...

Empirical studies show that agents often violate Bayes' rule in updating probability expectations. This paper deals with errors in combining observations with prior knowledge. Such errors neccessarily occur when agents have limited information-processing capacities. It is shown that rational...