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Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491

Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

Glöckner, Andreas; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kube, Sebastian; … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612391

Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes

Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy … market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548347

We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614920

The Joint Benefits of Observed and Unobserved Punishment: Comment to Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation

Glöckner, Andreas; Kube, Sebastian; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535929

Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Normann, Hans-Theo; Wallace, Brian - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633227

Cooperation norms in multiple-stage punishment

Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game. Their findings are striking: absolute norms outperform the relative norms commonly regarded as the determinants of punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008474676

Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good, Experimental Evidence

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.; Martinsson, Peter; Staffiero, … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2005

We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contributions. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612385

Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the … splitting their votes, or they coordinate but cannot aggregate information. With approval voting, expected welfare is strictly … equilibrium under plurality. Which one is selected depends on the size of the minority. Approval voting vastly outperforms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604504

Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence

Shachat, Jason; Swarthout, J. Todd - 2013

We report results from an experiment in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement or an experience weighted attraction learning algorithm. Our experiment shows these learning algorithms detect exploitable opportunities more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010892098

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