We report data from controlled laboratory experiments on two-sided matching markets in which participants interact in a decentralized way, without having to refer to a central clearinghouse. Our treatments have been designed to evaluate the effect of information, search costs, and binding...

Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of...

We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match- ing, frms are successively chosen in a random fashion and offer their positions to the workers they prefer the most. We propose an algorithm that generalizes some well-known algorithms and explore some of its...

In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilib- rium yields a degenerate probability...

We present an experimental study where we analyze three well- known matching mechanisms - the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms - in three different informational set- tings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, sug- gesting that the TTC...

This paper addresses the issue of industrial development using a coordination game. Complementarities between transport infrastructure provision by the Government and consumer goods manufacturing firms, and among consumer goods firms themselves dictate the outcome: either the transport...