Recent experimental evidence suggests that some people dislike telling lies, and tell the truth even at a cost. We use experiments as well to study the socio-demographic covariates of such lie aversion, and find gender and religiosity to be without predictive value. However, subjects’ major is...

Prior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co–players have the opportunity to approve/disapprove a player’s choice, even if that has no consequences on the player’s material payoff. Using a prisoner’s dilemma, we experimentally study the causes of this phenomenon,...

The literature on social norms stresses that compliance with norms is approved while deviance is disapproved. Based on this, we explore the content of social norms using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback stage. Our data suggests that subjects either care about a...

In games with multiple equilibria, the fairest equilibrium –in case one exists- may be the obvious solution for some players but not for others, and players can be aware of this heterogeneity. This paper theoretically explores how coordination could be achieved in this case. The model is...

In experimental games, many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest and they do that in a reciprocal manner. In addition, many subjects punish those others who behave unkindly, and previous history usually influences subjects’ choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model...

We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games with non-binding communication (‘cheap talk’). It is based on two key ideas: People are conditionally averse to break norms of honesty and fairness (i.e., the emotional cost of breaking a norm is...