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Should we tax or let firms trade emissons? An experimental analysis with policy implications for developing countries

Coria, Jessica; Villegas-Palacio, Clara; Cárdenas, … - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2011

In this paper we use laboratory experiments to test the theoretical predictions derived by Villegas-Palacio and Coria (2010) about the effects of the interaction between technology adoption and incomplete enforcement. They show that under Tradable Emissions Permits (TEPs), and in contrast to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019087

Why Do Environmental Taxes Work Better in Developed Countries?

Coria, Jessica; Villegas-Palacio, Clara; Cárdenas, J.C. - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2012

We compare of the performance of emission taxes between Colombia and Sweden in an experimental setting where subjects are regulated through environmental taxes and had to decide on emission levels, compliance behavior, and adoption of an environmentally friendly technology. Our design allows us...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399315

The House Money Effect and Negative Reciprocity

Danková, Katarína; Servátka, Maroš - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2014

In the vast majority of laboratory experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with … reciprocal behavior. In this study we identify two reasons why the source of endowment might matter for negative reciprocity: (1 …) Using earned – as opposed to windfall money – might increase the costs of negative reciprocity due to this money being in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011127992

The House Money Effect and Negative Reciprocity

Danková, Katarína; Servátka, Maroš - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2014

In the vast majority of experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with windfall funds … of endowment might matter for negative reciprocity: (1) Using earned – as opposed to windfall money – might increase the … costs of negative reciprocity due to this money being in a different mental account and thus lead to less retaliation. (2 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907394

Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Reciprocal Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission

Cox, James C.; Servátka, Maroš; Vadovic, Radovan - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2013

Both the law and culture make a central distinction between acts of commission that overturn the status quo and acts of omission that uphold it. In everyday life acts of commission often elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. In this paper we compare reciprocal responses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907397

Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services – Theory and Experiment

Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2010

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562419

Unequal Outside Options in the Lost Wallet Game

Servátka, Maroš; Vadovic, Radovan - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2009

Experimental evidence suggests the size of the foregone outside option of the first mover does not affect the behavior of the second mover in the lost wallet game. In this paper we experimentally compare the behavior of subjects when they face an outside option with unequal payoffs, i.e., the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577771

Does Fairness of the Outside Option Matter?

Servátka, Maroš; Vadovic, Radovan - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2008

Experimental evidence suggests that the size of the foregone outside option does not affect the behavior of the opponent in a lost wallet and pie sharing games but that it matters in a mini-ultimatum game. In this paper we experimentally test a conjecture that it is the fairness property of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111049

Would The Right Social Preference Model Please Stand Up!

Daruvala, Dinky - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2006

A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from economic experiments. We test the relative performance of some of these models using an experimental design that is aimed at capturing pure distributional concerns in a multi-person setting. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423933

Cooperation in teams: the role of identity, punishment and endowment distribution

Weng, Qian; Carlsson, Fredrik - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2013

Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as important means to reduce free riding and to promote cooperation in teamwork settings. This paper examines the relative importance of these two mechanisms, as well as the importance of income distribution in team cooperation. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019126