horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the value, and is thus the midpoint of the core …Singlevalued solutions for the case of twosided market games without product differentiation, also known as B ohmBawerk …. Moreover a characterization of this set of games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided. …

players. Like in competitive equilibrium, a core solution is determined by shadow prices on state-dependent claims. And like … price-supported core allocation. …

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max …-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with nonnegative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a … consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all …

-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B … sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern. …We introduce the class of multi-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided B ohm …

necessary and sufficient conditions for the core of balanced games containing the Shapley value are given. Connections between …Different propietats of convex and average convex games are developed in terms of unanimity coordinates. A set of …. Average convex simple games are described. Finally, some differences between convexity and average convexity in relation with …

assignment games. …

-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations. Non- square markets are analyzed also by reducing them to appropriate square … matched with seller j, the market produces aij units of utility. We study Monge assignment games, that is bilateral … cooperative assignment games where the assignment matrix satisfies the Monge property. These matrices can be characterized by the …

In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the … payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those … allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentially compatible …