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Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

Fellner, Gerlinde; Sausgruber, Rupert; Traxler, Christian - 2009

We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294768

Social Comparison and Optimal Contracts in the Competition for Managerial Talent

Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus - 2020

We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for managerial talent. Adding a disutility of social comparison as induced by a ranking of verifiable efforts to the multi-task model by Bénabou and Tirole (4238), we demonstrate that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012609028

Incentives and selection in promotion contests: Is it possible to kill two birds with one stone?

Stracke, Rudi; Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; … - 2014

This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a promotion contest by making the competition more (or less) dynamic. A comparison of static (one-stage) and dynamic (two-stage) contests reveals that this is not the case. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397151

Incentives for dishonesty: An experimental study with internal auditors

Balafoutas, Loukas; Czermak, Simon; Eulerich, Marc; … - 2017

the nature of provided incentives. We conduct a 'lab in the field' experiment with internal auditors during two large … performance of the unit that they are auditing. We vary incentives in the experiment from individual (piece rate) to competitive … that incentive-based compensation increases dishonest behavior among internal auditors: competitive incentives lead to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011869127

Experiments in finance - A survey of historical trends

Huber, Christoph; Kirchler, Michael - 2022

Experiments can complement other methods in identifying causal relationships and in measuring behavioral deviations from theoretical predictions. While the experimental method has long been central in many scientific disciplines, it was almost nonexistent in finance until the 1980s. To survey...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014319991

Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity

Sebald, Alexander; Walzl, Markus - 2012

As we have demonstrated in a recent laboratory experiment [see Sebald and Walzl (2012)], individuals tend to sanction others who subjectively evaluate their performance whenever this assessment falls short of the individual's self-evaluation even if their earnings are unaffected by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312214

Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations

Sebald, Alexander; Walzl, Markus - 2012

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefitting from a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312226

Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives.

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2013

Managers often use tournaments which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In this paper we compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the corresponding incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize optimal contracts in a principal-agent setting, using a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312236

Wage dispersion and workers' effort

Rivas, Maria Fernanda; Sutter, Matthias - 2008

We study experimentally the relationship between intra-firm wage dispersion chosen by principals and workers' performance. Principals show a preference for more egalitarian wage schemes, and workers are negatively influenced by high levels of wage inequality.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293416

Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments: An experimental study

Sutter, Matthias; Strassmair, Christina - 2007

We study the effects of communication in an experimental tournament between teams. When teams, rather than individuals, compete for a prize there is a need for intra-team coordination in order to win the inter-team competition. Introducing communication in such situations may have ambiguous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293434