A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme position s of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These functions are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and must satisfy...

A spatial model of party competition is studied in which, (i) Parties are supposed to have ideology. By this we mean that their goal is to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. (ii) The policy implemented after the election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by the winner....

This paper analyses the optimal inspection, tax and penalty functions, in models where the principal knows the distribution of agent types, inspections are perfect and costly, and where the actions and the types of agents are not costlessly observable by the principal. Agents and the principal...

This paper attempts to detect the existence of links in consumptionpreferences between generations. Preferences for consumption goods may bedetermined by the preferences of parents (vertical transmission) and/or bypreferences arising from the environment (horizontal transmission). Wepropose an...

The popular support obtained by two parties who propose two qualitatively different tax schernes is analyzed. We show that if the median voter is below the mean, then any progressive proposal always wins over a regressive one, provided it leaves the poorest agent at least as well off as the...

We develop a model of spatial political competition with ideological parties and uncertainty. The political issue is the income tax rate and the amount of a public good. The ideology of each party is determine endogenously. We show that the tax rate does not coincide with the ideal policy of the...

In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbours and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the economy. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the first, agents do not have priors about what is going on in the rest...

This paper studies the economic determinants, from an aggregate perspective, of Spanishinterregional labor force flows. Its main characteristics are that it is based on a matching model ofthe labor market applied to migration, and that uses gross flows instead of net ones as otherstudies do....

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first some voters are policy motivated and some are "impressionable" - their vote depends directly on campaign...