This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

We consider the problem of fair allocate an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-•peaked preferences and private endowments. First, we show that the adaptation of the uniform rule to this context is the only selection from the no-envy in redistributions and Pareto efficient...

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...

We develop a simple model in which individuals migrate freely among regions. In each region there is a majority voting procedure that determines a proportional taxation on earnings which finances a uniform transfer for each of the agents. Equilibrium requires that no one wishes to migrate and...

We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is aspecial interest group with well-defined preferences on political issues. Voters are of two kinds:impressionable and knowledgeable. The impressionable voters are influenced by the electioncampaigns....