This paper deals with price competition among multiproduct firms. We consider a model with n firms and one representative buyer. Each firm produces a set of products that can be different or identical to the other firms' products. The buyer is characterized by her willingness to pay -in monetary...

We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods. We show that subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes are...

Repeated games with probabilistic horizon are defined as those games where players have a common probability structure over the length of the game's repetition, T. In particular, for each t, they assign a probability pt to the event that "the game ends in period t". In this framework we analyze...

This paper considers a firm facing an uncertain demand curve. The firm can experimentally adjust its output in order to gain information that willincrease expected future profits. We examine two basic questions. Under whatconditions is it worthwhile for the firm to experiment? How does the...

Game theory lacks an explanation of how players' beliefs are formed and why they are in equilibrium. This is the reason why it has failed to make significant advances with the problem of equilibrium selection even for quite siniple games, as 2x2 games with two strict Nash equilibria. Our paper...

This paper analyzes how learning considerations may influence the pricing behavior of a duopoly facing demand uncertainty. We consider a symmetric duopoly game with product differentiation where firms have imperfect information about some parameters of the market demands. Firm learn about these...

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both...

The main result of this paper is that any correlated equlibrium pay-off of a two-player completeinformation game with rational parameters can be reached through an unmediated costlesspre-play conversation scheme. This problem was left open by Barany and Forges' analysis. Ourcommunication...

In a context of economic integration, we analyse the strategic effect of wo policies: merger policy and state aid policy. When governments play a Stackelberg policy game before firms compete in the market we find that: a) only under certain conditions, the leader country chooses a merger policy...

Strategic interaction in oligopolistic markets has been extensively studied in the literature. This literature deals mostly with the case of multiple firms which produce a homogeneous good or goods that are perfect substitutes. In this paper we provide a simple model of price competition in a...