This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more...

Previous work on board size effects in closely held corporations has established a negative correlation between board size and firm performance. We argue that this work has been incomplete in analysing the causal relationship due to lack of ownership information and weak identification...

Boards are endogenously chosen institutions determined by observable and unobservable firm characteristics. Empirical studies of large publicly traded firms have successfully controlled for observable determinants of board size and shown a robust negative relationship between board size and firm...

We analyze firms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms’ incentives to cluster are...

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces e.ort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment...