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We present typical scenarios and general insights from a novel dynamic model of farsighted climate coalition formation … scenarios of such a climate coalition formation process which show that a first-best state with a coordinated global carbon …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756287
This paper examines the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an economy with trade. We extent the basic model of the IEAs by letting countries choose emission taxes and import tariffs as their policy instruments in order to manage climate change and control trade. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862949
issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the … critical role over the outcome of the coalition formation game. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899731
countries, allowing for transfers. We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative model of coalition formation. In the first stage each … simultaneously. Coalition members agree also to share the gains from cooperation in the first stage. We use quadratic benefit and … examining the impact of transfers on the coalition size, we apply the notion of Potential Internal Stability (PIS). Results show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011850334
that the grand coalition could be stable for both types of agreement, but for extremely high degrees of effectiveness of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012519985
We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283164
of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715099
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003356109
information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390
coalition, and regions which have the highest claims according to the respective sharing rule. Furthermore, we find that a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603652