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All-Pay auctions with negative prize externalities : theory and experimental evidence

Sacco, Dario; Schmutzler, Armin - 2008

; experiment ; overbidding …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892457

Uncertainty and risk-aversion in a dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices

Valentini, Edilio; Vitale, Paolo - 2019

In this paper we present a dynamic discrete-time model that allows to investigate the impact of risk-aversion in an …-time limit of our model with no uncertainty and no risk-aversion. Focusing on the continuous-time limit of the infinite horizon … inversely related to the degrees of uncertainty and risk-aversion. However, the effect of uncertainty and risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980689

All-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers

Fibich, Gadi; Gavious, Arieh; Sela, Aner - 2004

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We … show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they … would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599258

Nonparametric tests for common values in first-price sealed-bid auctions

Haile, Philip A.; Hong, Han; Shum, Matthew - 2004

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607262

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2010

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659956

Auctioning vs. grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

Alvarez González, Francisco; André, Francisco J. - 2013

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226080

Bidding for conservation contracts

Di Corato, Luca; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2014

account for the risk of opportunistic behavior could lead to the choice of sellers who will not provide the contracting agency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380650

Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - 2010

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737094

Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion : bribes, signals and selection

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2014 - This version: November 20, 2014

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820

The chopstick auction : a study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions

Onderstal, Sander; Englmaier, Florian; Guillén, Pablo; … - 2004

Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information both in theory and in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599133