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Endogenizing private information : incentive contracts under learning by doing
Gärtner, Dennis (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full … commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on … whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of production. Hence, what …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521609
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Adverse selection and private health insurance coverage in India : a rational behaviour model of insurance agents under asymmetric information
Vellakkal, Sukumar - 2009
In the backdrop of the low level of health insurance coverage in India, this study examines the determinants of the scaling-up process of health insurance by analyzing the rational behaviour of an insurance agent facing a trade-off between selling ‘health insurance’ and ‘other forms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003817275
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Asymmetric information with multiple risks : the case of the Chilean private health insurance market
Mata, Dolores de la; Machado, Matilde P.; Olivella, Pau; … - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013454461
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Dynamic regulation of public franchises with imperfectly correlated demand shocks
Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2023
In a continuous-time setting, we study the design of a dynamic contract between a government and a private entity, wherein the latter commits to pay the government in return for the exclusive right to sell a service by operating a public facility. Private revenues are modelled as depending on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013547855
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Monopolistic screening under learning by doing
Gärtner, Dennis - 2007
technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full … commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on … whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of production. Hence, what …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452
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Efficient communication in organizations
Vaccari, Federico - 2022
Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. An efficient communication protocol grants completeinformation payoffs to all organization members, thereby overcoming asymmetric information problems at no cost. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463790
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Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity
Netzer, Nick; Scheuer, Florian - 2009 - Revised version
We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise endogenously from unobservable savings or labor supply decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high risk individuals may ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003900923
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
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Misallocation of talent in competitive labor markets
Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares; Nikolowa, Radoslawa - 2015
We develop a model in which competition in the labor market may produce worker-firm matches that are inferior to those obtained in the absence of competition. This result contrasts with the conventional wisdom that competition among employers allocates scarce talent efficiently. In a model in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010497514
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Information design in coalition formation games
Vosooghi, Sareh - 2017
I examine a setting, where an information sender conducts research into a payoff-relevant state variable, and releases information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The sender, who has commitment power, by designing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390